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Cache-Timing Attack on the SEAL Homomorphic Encryption Library

Abstract : Homomorphic encryption (HE) ensures provable secrecy of data processed in the ciphertext domain. However, it happens that FHE private-key algorithms can be broken by side-channel attacks. We disclose a novel cache-timing attack on the SEAL open-source HE library. It is triggered by a non-constant time Barrett modular multiplication, which is one of the building blocks in SEAL. We both analyze the mathematical conditions upon which the leakage occurs and show the experimental feasibility of the attack.
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https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-03780506
Contributor : Ulrich Kühne Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, September 19, 2022 - 2:17:24 PM
Last modification on : Friday, October 7, 2022 - 4:24:55 AM

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6469-CacheTimingAttackSEAL.pdf
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  • HAL Id : hal-03780506, version 1

Citation

Wei Cheng, Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley, Fan Huang, Amina Bel Korchi, et al.. Cache-Timing Attack on the SEAL Homomorphic Encryption Library. 11th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems (PROOFS 2022), Sep 2022, Leuven, Belgium. ⟨hal-03780506⟩

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